

EDINBURGH-TURIN SEMINARS ON STOICISM

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5 pm Central Europe / **11 am** US East Coast

ONLINE

<https://columbiauniversity.zoom.us/j/91860595685>

THE FLAW OF GENERICIS

Speaker

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The truth of generics such as “ducks lay eggs” is often taken to be intuitive. For the Stoics, this intuition is flawed. Qua thoughts, they argue, generics are neither true nor false. Qua utterances, generics are not bivalently truth-apt. The Stoics ascribe the following flaw to generics: generics predicate something of a kind that is only true of some instances of the kind and that can only be predicated of “somethings”. Given the Stoic rejection of Forms, forms, and essences, kinds are not somethings. And yet, the Stoics are greatly interested in the fact that generics can seem true to us. Their study is part of a normative approach in logic. The virtues of non-precipitancy and non-randomness, as well as other logical virtues, are needed in order to avoid flawed reasoning, including assent to generics.